Alas, the Russian-Ukrainian summit in Istanbul confirms the state of confusion of Western media when faced with the new international framework.
Opinion-driven reporting overshadowing factual analysis, interpretations based on preconceived grids, compulsive portrayals, romanticized behind-the-scenes narratives, and steadfast defense of reference narratives.
These are symptoms of geopolitical journalism caught in a full-blown performance anxiety, constantly chasing events. Able to say one thing and its opposite from one day to the next. And then forget it tomorrow.
Caught in this loop, in the face of the unusual late-night press statement in which Vladimir Putin proposed to resume Russian-Ukrainian negotiations in Istanbul, interrupted in 2022, major observers made two significant missteps.
Misinterpretation vs. Dilemma
The first was a misinterpretation regarding the possible participation of the Russian president in the negotiations. Predictions were made without questioning either the real plausibility of the gesture or its compatibility with Russian political codes.
At first, by (more or less deliberately) misinterpreting Putin’s words, many took his presence in Istanbul for granted, to the point of making it a breaking news story.
In the following days, an internal debate arose within the Western front, hypothesizing that Moscow was uncertain until the very end. Statements by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs Kaja Kallas lent excessive tactical significance to Putin’s presence in Istanbul.
As if this signaled Moscow’s genuine intention to end the conflict. As if the success or failure of the negotiations depended solely on this single aspect.
In reality, all signals from the Kremlin (starting with the clarifications from Yuri Ushakov, who holds a constitutionally higher position than Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov within the Russian government structure) had immediately indicated the high improbability of the Russian president traveling to Turkey in person.
Negotiating vs. Signing (Peace)
Rather than being driven by a specific contingency, this choice is dictated by a well-established modus operandi of Russian foreign policy. The institutional formalism and mechanical technicality that characterize its diplomacy discourage improvisation and unpredictable moves, favoring continuity.
From this perspective, the President’s figure is never exposed in an embryonic negotiation phase with uncertain outcomes—especially if conducted abroad—but only steps in once an agreement is reached, to ratify it.
The decision to resume dialogue in Istanbul, therefore, clearly points to continuity with the 2022 negotiations, whose failure the Kremlin has always blamed on Kyiv and London. Once again entrusting the leadership of the Russian delegation to Vladimir Medinsky—a figure little known in the West but pivotal in Putin’s inner circle—serves to underline this connection to the past.
Preserving Charisma
There is also the need to safeguard, both internally and internationally, the institutional charisma of the Russian president—a crucial aspect of the Russian power structure, especially at such a critical juncture.
A face-to-face meeting between Zelensky and Putin would have represented an opportunity for the former to regain momentum at a challenging moment for Ukraine, but it would have exposed the latter to unnecessary risk, tarnishing his image just a few days after the legitimacy-boosting celebrations of the 80th anniversary of victory over Nazi-fascism.
Moreover, putting Putin on the same level as Zelensky would have made the two leaders appear equal. It would have seemed like a symbolic concession from the Russians—an acknowledgment of the Ukrainian president’s authority. A form of undue equivalence, blatantly contradicting the Russian narrative about Kyiv, which accuses the current Ukrainian leadership of lacking legitimacy.
Moscow’s Counter-Ultimatum
A far more serious mistake made by Western observers was underestimating another part of Putin’s late-night statement.
Here, Russia’s plans for the conflict in Ukraine are revealed—openly, no less.
Reading his words as a mere response to the ultimatum imposed by the so-called «Group of the Willing» failed to grasp the essence of a real Russian counter-ultimatum.
By reiterating the refusal to the Western demand for a ceasefire (Moscow fears it could be used by the West to reorganize the Ukrainian army), Putin reaffirmed a concept that at first glance might seem obvious: another failure in Istanbul would mean a continuation of the conflict.
Special Operation vs. War
The novelty lies in how it was expressed.
For the first time since February 2022, Putin hinted at the possibility of moving from a «special operation» to a full-fledged state of «war.» A significant paradigm shift, marked by the use of the Russian word Война (Vainà)—never previously uttered in official contexts.
According to the formalist technicality mentioned earlier, this upgrade would not just be rhetorical. It would represent a qualitative leap in Moscow’s involvement in the conflict, both in the intensity of military action and in the considerable expansion of the rules of engagement, as foreseen by Russian military doctrine in such cases.
This would create the ideal context for an intensification of military initiatives in the coming summer months, with the deployment of new army forces (such as the newly prepared reserve divisions ready for the front) and the large-scale use of the notorious Орешник (Oreshnik) missiles.
This would give strength to the idea of a military campaign pushing Russian forces to the Dnipro River and gaining control of the entire eastern side of Ukraine. This escalation is still evoked by Kremlin hawks, particularly among the ranks of the Armiya Rossii, which has consolidated itself more than any other elite during the three years of conflict.
Regardless of the outcome, it will not be easy for Russian military patriotism to transition from the exceptional state of war back to the routine of victory parades in Red Square.
